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Abstract
In the context of the unitary model of household labour supply we test
whether the husband's work is separable from consumption and the wife's
work. We apply a conditional preferences approach to derive a conditional
labor supply function for the wife consistent with a unitary model with non-
separable preferences. Our main results are that consumption and wife's
work hours are not separable from the husband's labour supply. Further-
more we nd that the wife's and husband's work hours are complements
when men tend to work longer hours than a typical full-time contract.
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Wives' Labor Supply and Taxation: A Conditional
Preferences Approach
1 Introduction
The study of labor supply is important to evaluate the impact of scal reforms on
labor markets, especially the estimation of responses of labor supply to wages and
income changes. In this respect the literature has particularly focused on married
women labor supply since this latter has been judged to be more responsive to
these variables (see Blundell and Macurdy [5] and Salanie [20] , chapter 2). Also
according to Browning et al.[8], it is still important to study the interaction of
labor supply between men and women since we still need to match the general
equilibrium modelling with the micro empirical evidence. In this respect, it seems
that this question has been overlooked in modern macroeconomic modelling. For
example, the usual assumption of separability of leisure with respect to consump-
tion in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models is based on the stylized fact
that per-capita leisure has stayed constant over time. However this masks dierent
trends for male and female labor supplies which are not consistent with this latter
assumption [8].
Many studies on married women's labor supply assume that a woman's work
hours are inuenced by the labor supply of her spouse only through an income
eect. In such a case we implicitly assume that in the context of the unitary model
of household labor supply, the leisure of the husband is separable from consumption
and his wife's leisure. This assumption is not very plausible and its violation will
bias the estimates due to a misspecication of the model. For example the presence
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of xed costs of working will invalidate this assumption. Moreover this assumption
excludes any complementarity or substitutability between the labor supply of the
two household members. When we relax this assumption the wife's work hours
not only depends on the earnings of her husband but also on his work hours. It
has thus dierent policy implications in terms of optimal taxation since we have
to take into account these aspects of the households behavior besides the income
eects (Browning and Meghir [9] and Salanie [20], chapter 5).
We test in the context of the unitary model of household labor supply whether
the husband's labor supply is separable from consumption and the wife's work
hours. In order to test this assumption, we apply a conditional demand approach
(see [18]) to obtain a conditional labor supply function for the wife which is consis-
tent with a unitary model where preferences are non-separable. We estimate the
wife's conditional labor supply and perform a statistical test on whether male's
labor supply enters signicantly into the regression. This approach is especially
suited when the conditioning good is in predetermined quantity (Browning and
Meghir [9]) and we also check to a certain extent the validity of this assumption.
As far as we are concerned this is the rst time this research question is asked.
The integration in the empirical analysis of the progressivity of income taxation
is an important source of identication of the wage responses. More specically
when the tax authorities consider the household as a unique entity and apply a joint
ling to determine taxation rates of married couples, the two spouses experience
the same marginal tax rate and the distribution of earnings within the household
is an important determinant of labor supply. Therefore we implement an empirical
model which takes into account this feature.
The results of the empirical model show that we can reject the hypothesis that
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the husband's labor supply is separable from consumption and his wife's work
hours. Moreover we nd that for men who tend to work longer hours than a con-
ventional full-time contract, their wife tends to work longer hours as well suggesting
their leisure are complements. We have also found that the wage elasticities with
respect to female labor supply are lower and that the negative impact of an in-
crease of the husband's hourly wage is increased when we assume non-separability.
This suggests the existence of a bias in the estimates when we assume separability.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the theoretical frame-
work and show with the concept of conditional preferences how we can obtain a
conditional labor supply function which allows to test the separability assumption.
Section 3 presents the specication of the empirical model and how we test sep-
arability of male's labor supply from consumption and female's labor supply. In
section 4 we present the results of our empirical analysis. We used cross-section
data from the Swiss family expenditure survey Enque^te sur les Revenus et la Con-
sommation 1998 (ERC 98). Section 5 gives some concluding comments.
2 Theoretical framework
In order to understand the benets of using the conditional approach we rst
present a simple static model without taxation. In section 2.2 we consider a more
realistic setup where we introduce taxation and the aspects of life-cycle labor
supply.
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2.1 Household unitary model of labor supply and condi-
tional preferences
Consider the following unitary and static labor supply model
max
c;hf ;hm
U (c; hf ; hm) (1)
s:t: c = wfhf + wmhm +N;
where c is consumption, hf the wife's work hours, hm the husband's hours and N
is the household's nonlabor income. The household maximizes its utility under its
budget constraint. In this model, the household chooses simultaneously the work
hours of its two members1. We dene fx as the partial derivative of f with respect
to x: The rst order conditions of problem (1) are  Uhf=Uc = wf and  Uhm=Uc =
wm and allow us to nd marshallian labor supply functions h

f = hf (wf ; wm; N)
and hm = hm (wf ; wm; N).
We can also obtain labor supply functions for the wife conditional to the hus-
band's labor supply2. Assume that in problem (1) hm is in a predetermined quan-
1Blundell and MaCurdy [5] point out that many people tend to interpret this model as a
situation where the individuals choose their work hours for a given wage with a unique employer.
Actually, we can think of a situation where the workers choose their work hours in selecting
dierent employers oering dierent wage opportunities. In this case the labour supply function
approximates the average relationship for agents' preferences between consumption and leisure.
2For an exposition of the conditional preferences, on can refer to Pollak [18], Pollak and
Wales [19] and Browning and Meghir [9].
5
tity hm. The optimization problem can be rewritten as follows.
max
c;hf
U
 
c; hf ;hm

(2)
s:t: c = wfhf + wmhm +N
The rst order condition is similar to the one obtained with the unconditional
approach, i.e.
 Uhf
 
c; hf ;hm

Uc
 
c; hf ;hm
 = wf (3)
Substituting the budget constraint in (3), we obtain the wife's labor supply func-
tion conditional on her husband's work hours which we denote by bhf
hf = bhf  wf ; wmhm +N; hm : (4)
The relation between the conditional and the unconditional labor supply function
is obtained by substituting hm by h

m in (4). We obtain
hf = bhf (wf ; wmhm +N; hm (wf ; wm; N)) (5)
= hf (wf ; wm; N) :
Note that when hm is separable from c and hf we can write (4) more simply as
hf = bhf  wf ; wmhm +N (6)
As suggested by Browning and Meghir [9], we can implement a simple test for
separability. When hm is separable from the other variables, the work hours of the
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husband only enter in the wife's labor supply via the resources wmhm +N:
As the latter authors [9] notice, there are several advantages in applying the
conditional preferences approach. First it is particularly suited when the condi-
tioning good is rationed. Second, this approach allows a simple test of separability
between consumption and leisure of one member from the leisure of his spouse.
Third, we do not have to model explicitly the determination of the conditioning
good. It is important to understand that the conditional approach does not im-
ply that the conditioning good is considered as exogenous. It only consists in a
rewriting of the unitary model.
However, there exists one drawback to this approach. All the implications in
terms of policy evaluation will be conditional on the husband's work hours. We
dene f  wmhm +N as the nonlabor income of the wife. In a unitary model a
variation in the wife's wage will have an eect on her labor supply as shown by
the dierentiating (7)
dbhf
dwf
=
@bhf
@wf
+
 
wm
@bhf
@f
+
@bhf
@hm
!
@hm
@wf
: (7)
The conditional approach implies we can only recover @bhf=@wf : Similarly, an in-
crease in the husband's wage rate will have an eect on the wife's labor supply
only through the earnings of the man, i.e.3
dbhf
dwm

hm
= wm
@bhf
@mf
(8)
However the assumption of predeterminedness of men's work hours may justify the
3In the unconditional case
dhf
dwm
= hm
@bhf
@mf
+ wm
@bhf
@mf
@hm
@wm
:
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predictions given by economic policy reforms implemented with this approach. We
can obtain @bhf=@wf ; @bhf=@hm and @bhf=@f by regressing hf on wf , f and hm.
With this regression we can test three hypothesis. First we can test whether c and
hf are separable from hm and second if hf and hm are complements or substitutes.
Third we can check if hm is exogenous in the labor supply decision of her spouse,
that is if he is subject to some rationing in his labor supply.
2.2 Taxation and life-cycle allocation
In this section we show how the analysis is modied when we introduce taxation
and life-cycle allocation of labor supply.
If we assume that preferences are intertemporally weakly separable, we can
apply the concept of two-stage budgeting (see Blundell and Walker [7], Arrellano
and Meghir [2] and Blundell and MaCurdy [5]) where in a rst-stage the full-
income of the household is allocated over the life-cycle and in a second stage
labor supply is determined for a given full income4. Blundell and MaCurdy [5]
show the importance of taking into account the life-cycle aspects of labor supply
decisions. This is especially important if we want to give an economic meaning to
the estimates of the labor supply elasticities. Let s designate household's savings
and T the amount of taxes paid by the household. In the second stage, once
the household members have determined their assets, the within-period budget
4In other words current savings is a sucient summary statistics about past and future
information held by the household on the allocation of resources over the life-cycle.
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constraint may now be written as5
c = wfhf + wmhm +N   T   s: (9a)
We dene !f = wf (1  t) as the wife's marginal wage rate, where t is the
marginal tax rate of the household6. The marginal rate of substitution between
leisure of wife and consumption is equal to her marginal wage rate, i.e.
 Uhf (c; hf ; hm)
Uc(c; hf ;hm)
= !f : (10)
We can rewrite the within-period budget (9a) constraint as
c = !fhf +mf ; (11)
where mf  twfhf+wmhm+N T s = c !fhf is the virtual non-labor income
of the wife as dened by Hausman [16]. We can dene the wife's labor supply
conditional on the husband's work hours (12). It results from the maximization of
the household's utility function conditional on the husband's labor supply under
a budget constraint where the non-labor income is mf and the price of leisure is
the marginal wage rate !f . Equation (4) is modied as
hf = bhf  !f ;mf ; hm (12)
!f and mf are endogenous variables which depend on the wife's work hours, the
5This result has been shown by Blundell and Walker [7]. One can also refer to Blundell and
MaCurdy [5].
6We consider only joint ining.
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earnings of the husband, the non labor income, the amount of income tax and
savings. From the budget constraint we can directly observemf since this quantity
is the dierence between consumption and the marginal wage rate times work
hours.
3 Data and specication
3.1 Data
In our empirical analysis, we have used the data of a Swiss family expenditure
survey the Enque^te sur les Revenus et la Consommation 1998 (ERC 98). This
survey provides detailed information about consumption and income data for swiss
households. We also nd information on labor supply of the household, occupation
status, the structure of the household and housing. In particular, the ERC 98
provides the number of work hours for each member of the household. But the
data on earnings were only collected for workers. We selected households consisting
of married couples where the wife was either a worker or outside of the labor force
and the husband was working. We excluded from the sample people who were
self-employed because of measurement error in earnings, and households where
children worked for pay. Finally on the basis of additional criteria we have obtained
a sample of 2795 households. Consumption is dened as the sum of non durable
consumption expenditures. We provide in appendix A further details about the
data.
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3.2 Testing separability
We have chosen to estimate the following labor supply equation7.
hf;i =  ln!f;i + mf;i + f (hm;i; ) + zi + uh;i (13)
where !f;i is the marginal wage, mf;i the virtual nonlabor income, the vector zi
is a set of demographics, whose choice is discussed in the appendix, and uh;i is
an error term which can be interpreted as the unobserved taste factor for work
(Blundell and MaCurdy [5]).
The term f (; ) is a function of hm and  is the vector of parameters associ-
ated with this function. Given that the conditional approach imposes quite weak
restrictions on how the conditioning goods interact with the other commodities
(see Browning and Meghir [9]), we can choose a rather exible functional form for
f (hm; ). In section 2.1 we have seen under the assumption that hm is separable
from consumption and hf ; that once we have conditioned the labor supply function
on the wage and the nonlabor income, hm should not enter in the labor supply
equation. This suggests that a simple test of separability consists in estimating
the equation (13) and test if  is equal to zero. A natural way to start is to specify
a linear function in hm: However, it is likely that the preferences of the couples are
better described by a non-linear function of hm: We propose to include dummy
variables for dierent intervals of the distribution of hm as well as a cubic spline
using these dummy variables.
7The indirect utility function associated with this labour supply equation is
v (wf ;mf ;hm; z) =
exp(wf )
 (mf + f (hm; ) + z + uh +  lnwf )  
R
wf
exp(t)
 dt
This specication of the labor supply has been used by Blundell et. al. [4].
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3.3 Estimation method
We face two problems. First, as shown in section 2.1, the marginal wage and the
virtual nonlabor income are endogenous and need to be instrumented. Second,
since work hours and the virtual wage are observed only when the wife works
there is a self-selection problem. As shown by Cogan [11] when xed costs of work
are present, the wife will work if her desired number of work hours is above her
reservation level Therefore we have decided to estimate the labor supply function
through a generalized tobit model. In this context and in order to take into account
the endogeneity problem mentioned above we have used generalized residuals of
the marginal wage and the virtual nonlabor income (see Chesher and Irish [10],
Gourieroux et al. [15]). In appendix B we provide the details of the estimation
procedure and describe the instruments we used. We also provide details about
how we compute the marginal tax rates of the household.
4 Results
In this section, we present the empirical results of our test of whether male's labor
supply is separable from consumption and female's labor supply.
In order to test the separability hypothesis we have estimated four dierent
specications for the functional form with respect to male's labor supply. In table
1 we present the results of the estimation of the labor supply equation. In the
appendix C we give the details of the estimation results of the conditional labor
supply function for married women. In specication (1) we have estimated the
separable case where hm is excluded from the model. Specication (2) is the linear
case where we condition the model linearly on hm: Then in column (3) we have
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estimated the model by including dummy variables for hm in dierent categories,
i.e. less than 40 hours a week, between 40 and 42 hours a week and more than
42 hours a week8. Finally, in column 4 we have estimated the model with a cubic
spline in hm using the dummy variables described above.
- Insert Table 1 -
The main nding of our empirical analysis is that we are able to reject that
male's work hours are separable from non-durable consumption and the wife's
work hours. We can see in column 2 of table 1 that once we have controlled for the
wife's wage and non-labor income, hm enters signicantly in the model. It appears
that the parameters of the dummy variables are statistically dierent from zero
at a signicance level of 5%. For the cubic spline we nd that the eect of hm is
signicant at 5% for wives whose husband work more than 42 hours a week.
Our second nding suggests that on average male and female hours are com-
plements. An increase in the male hours increases ceteris paribus the incentive for
the wife to work more. This is supported by the fact that the eects of hm all else
equal (particularly the marginal tax rate and the earnings of the husband) on the
labor supply of the wife is positive. Furthermore, the specication (3) on table
2 with dummy variables reveals that ceteris paribus females tend to work longer
hours when their husband works more than 42 hours a week and work less if their
husband work less than 40 hours a week. This suggests also that leisure of both
spouses are complement. The cubic spline reveals the same phenomenon (column
(4)). Males' hours above 42 hours a week have a positive impact on female labor
supply. The other parameters are not signicant. In particular the parameter of
8According to typical swiss labour contracts a full-time job corresponds to 42.5 hours a week.
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the dummy variables for men working less than 40 hours a week looses its signi-
cance. We reestimated the model by including only the dummies 1[hm < 40] and
1[hm > 42] and the number of hours for men working above 42 hours a week, i.e.
hm[hm > 42]
In table 2, we report the elasticities of married women labour supply with
respect to her own wage, the husband's wage and the non-labor income of the
household. It is interesting to note that the wife's wage elasticity is lower when we
include the variables related to the male's labor supply compared to the separable
case. This suggests that once we have controlled for the wife's wage and non-labor
income if we omit to condition the model on the labour supply of the husband we
tend to bias these elasticities. We see that it is also the case for the elasticity with
respect to the husband's wage. This elasticity appears to be lower in the non-
separable case. This shows that taking non-separabilities into account changes the
eect on the hours of the wife due to a change in the husband's labor supply. This
also suggests that the estimates in the separable case are biased.
- Insert Table 2 -
Finally, we tested whether hm was exogenous in the wife's labor supply equa-
tion. We used the same type of exogeneity test developed by Blundell and Smith [6]
and used education of the husband as an instrument. Since the coecient did not
appear to be signicantly dierent from zero, we concluded that the assumption
of exogeneity could not be rejected.
In table 2, the elasticity of the female's labor supply with respect to her gross
hourly wage ranges from 1.33 to 1.016. The results are quite close to what Gern9
9The elasticity with respect to nonlabor income ranges from -0.26 to -0.32 and is also close
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has found in previous studies on married women labor supply in Switzerland [13],
[14]. Note that these results are not fully comparable with ours especially because
his models are derived in a static framework10.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, using a sample of Swiss married couples we have tested whether
male's work hours were separable from consumption and his wife's labor supply. In
order to do that we have applied the concept of conditional demand and shown how
we could obtain a labor supply function for the wife conditional on his husband's
work hours which is consistent with the household unitary model. We would
like to point out that few empirical studies on the married women labor supply
consider explicitly the interaction among the household for the allocation of labor
supply. The idea of estimating a labor supply function without conditioning on
the husband's work hours seems to rely else on the implicit assumption that men's
hours are separable from the other argument of the utility function or that men's
labor supply is relatively inelastic and does not contain enough variability. However
these assumption are never explicitly described. We have taken income taxation
into account since in the context of the labor supply it is an important source
of identication of wage and income labor supply responses. We have also used a
life-cycle consistent measure of non-labor income in order to get some interpretable
wage and income elasticities.
Our main result is the rejection of the separability assumption. Specications of
to what Gern found.
10We also have to say that the treatment of the taxation function is dierent. He approximates
the Swiss tax system by a single piece-wise linear function with 12 brackets.
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the conditional labor supply which are either linear in hm, include dummy variables
for hm or a cubic spline in male's work hours allow to reject the separability
hypothesis. When we assume separable preferences we obtain dierent estimates
of the wage and income responses compared to the non-separable case. We may
conclude that assuming non-separable preferences matters for policy evaluation.
The second result is that male and female labor supply are complements for couples
where the husband works more than 42 hours a week. We could not reject the
assumption of weak exogeneity of the husband's work hours. Although we have
estimated conditional elasticities, this former result gives to our empirical ndings
more relevance for policy implications on the labor market, since the husband's
work hours have been found to be exogenous to the wife.
A Data
We give here further details about the data. We report in table A1 the descriptive
statistics of the variables used in the model.
- Insert Table A1 -
The gure 1 shows the distribution of monthly work hours for the wives and
gure 2 the distribution for the husbands. Approximately 50 % of the married
women population are outside of the labor force and around 30% are working full-
time. Working wives tend to work shorter hours than their husbands who tend to
concentrate around 160 hours (40 hours a week). It also emerges that the typical
number of hours for a female's part-time job is around 20 hours a week.
Non durable consumption expenditures are dened as monthly sum of usual
groups like food, tobacco and alcohol, clothing, transports, communication, leisure,
16
education and other goods. Since we make the assumption of intertemporal sepa-
rability of preferences, we excluded durable goods and housing. We also excluded
health expenses, because they are supposed to help to maintain the welfare of
the household rather than to increase its utility11. We also excluded expenses for
health insurance since it constitutes a reduction in income rather than an increase
in welfare.
- Insert gures 1 and 2 -
B Econometric model
In this section of the appendix we give the details of our econometric model.
First we describe our estimation procedure. Then we provide details about the
specication. Finally, we detail the estimation method in order to obtain the
households marginal tax rates.
B.1 Estimation
Our goal is to estimate equation (13). First note that hfi and !fi are only ob-
served for the women who participate to the labor force. Let dfi denote an in-
dicator function which takes the value 1 if the wife works and 0 otherwise. Let
Ii designate a measure of the dierence in utilities of working and not working
(see Mroz [17]), Wf;i the set of the determinants of the participation decision,
sf as a vector of parameters and uSf ;i an error term with zero mean. We have
df;i = 1 [I

i = Wf;i+ uS;i > 0] and hfi and !fi are observed if and only if df;i = 1:
11Moreover it was impossible to distinguish between the actual amount paid by the household
and the amount of the invoice.
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As we have shown in section 2.1, the marginal wage and the virtual non-labor
income due to the progressivity of income tax are endogenous and are functions of
the number of work hours and the earnings of their husband. When we come to
estimate the model, we have to instrument these two variables. One solution is to
formulate the model as a simultaneous equation model where errors are distributed
jointly normal and to estimate it by full information maximum likelihood. Another
solution would be to use the properties of joint normality to derive a limited
information maximum likelihood estimator. We opt for the latter approach. We
assume that the log of the marginal wage and the virtual income are described by
the following equations
ln!f;i = hiw + uw;i (A1)
and
mf;i = him + um;i; (A2)
where w and m are vector of parameters and uw;i and um;i are error terms.
We assume that the vector u0i  (uh;i; uw;i; um;i; uS;i) is normally distributed with
zero-mean and covariance matrix . From joint normality we can write
uh;i = 'wuw;i + 'mum;i + i (A3)
where 'w and 'm are functions of the elements of ; and i is an error term with
E [ijuw;i; um;i] = 0: Substituting (A3) in the labor supply function (13) we get
hf;i =  ln!

f;i + mf;i + f (hm;i; ) + zi + 'wuw;i + 'mum;i + i: (A4)
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We estimate this equation in two steps. First we estimate the two equations which
explains the two endogenous variables in order to obtain generalized residuals
from these estimation which we denote euw;i and eum;i (see Chesher and Irish [10],
Gourieroux et al. [15])12. In a second step we estimate the labor supply equation
via the maximum likelihood estimator of Heckman's selection model including
the generalized residuals and using the selection equation described above. Since
ln!f;i is not observed for women outside of the labor force, euw;i are obtained
by the maximum likelihood estimator of the generalized tobit model (A1). The
residuals eum;i are obtained by estimating (A2) by OLS. Note that we are using
a two-step maximum likelihood estimator since the generalized residuals are also
obtained by a maximum likelihood estimation procedure. This implies that we
correct the asymptotic covariance matrix of this estimator (see Wooldridge [21]
for the computation of this matrix). The generalized residuals take the following
form
euw;i = b 1w buw;i=bw   bw=q1  b2wbw;i (A5)
and
eum;i = mf;i   hibm (A6)
where bw;i is the inverse mills ratio derived from the estimation by maximum
likelihood of model (A1) and buw;i = ln!f;i   hibw: The parameters bw and bw
are respectively the estimates of the variance of uw and the correlation coecient
between uw and the error term of the selection equation uS.
12The idea of generalized residuals has been applied for example by Blundell et al. [3] and
Duncan and Giles [12] on studies on the impact on lone-mothers labor supply of welfare programs
in the UK.
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B.2 Specication
We have included in the labor supply equation demographics such as the number
of children in some categories of age, the age and the age squared of the wife, the
number of years of education, dummy variables for her occupation status and a
dummy variable for swiss nationality as control variables. In the selection equation,
we included in the regression some demographics such as the number of children
in some categories of age, dummy variables for the age of the youngest child, the
potential experience of the wife13, the squared of this variable, the number of years
of education squared, dummy variable for swiss nationality as control variables,
dummy variables for the regional location of residency and a dummy variable for
whether the household lives in one the most populated area of Switzerland14. We
also included the gross earnings of the husband.
Finding instruments for the marginal wage and the virtual non-labor income
is a dicult task (see Mroz [17]). Obvious candidates for the marginal wage are
education and potential experience. The fact that education is truly exogenous
has been discussed in the literature (see Mroz [17]). It seems that in our model
and with our data education was correlated with the unobserved taste factor since
once we had introduced this variable in the model the associated parameter was
statistically dierent from zero. One other candidate for the marginal wage is
the gross wage rate but since it is computed as the wife's earnings divided by
her number of hours it will be measured with error and correlated with the error
term. Therefore we did not retain it. For the virtual nonlabor income we used
13It is dened as the wife's age less her number of years of education.
14Zurich, Geneva, Basel and Bern
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the gross earnings of the husband. It could be that labor supply of both spouses
are determined jointly meaning that hm is not exogenous to the wife. In this case
this variable will not be a valid instrument15. Education and potential experience
of the husband could be used as instruments for the virtual nonlabor income. It
seems plausible that these variables are correlated with virtual nonlabor income
(and the husband's earnings) but is uncorrelated with the taste factor for work of
the wife.
Finally we have instrumented the marginal wage and the virtual nonlabor in-
come with the wife's number of years of education squared, the number of children
older than 15, the gross earnings of the husband and his number of years of ed-
ucation. As discussed above the education is suspected to be endogenous and
therefore we have included it in the labor supply equation. Once we have con-
ditioned female's hours on education, education squared could be used as a valid
instrument. From the value of the Hansen J-statistic16 it seems that these instru-
ments are valid. We tried other instruments but they were judged weak or the
Hansen test-statistic for overidentifying restrictions lead us to reject their validity.
We have also tested the exogeneity assumption of the husband's work hours for
the specications proposed in this paper. This test is particularly important since
the conditional approach has more sense for policy evaluation when the spouse's
work hours are exogenous. First we have obtained residuals from a regression of
the male hours on the set of exogenous variables plus some instruments correlated
15The husband's hourly wage could be used as an instrument but since it is computed as
earnings divided by the number of work hours this will not solve the problem
16We have obtained the Hansen test-statistic for overidentifying restrictions in order to judge
the validity of our instruments, by modifying the Heckman's two-step estimator by a GMM
estimator in order to use instrumental variables.
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with the hours of the husbands but uncorrelated with the woman's taste factor. We
have chosen the age, the numbers of years of experience and his number of years of
education. Then we have reestimated the model by plugging these residuals into
the wife's hours equation.
B.3 Taxation function
In order to estimate our econometric model we have to approximate the taxation
function T (Y ) where Y is gross income In Switzerland, income tax is collected
at the municipality, "canton" (i.e. regional) and federal state level. Taxation
proles are dierent for each "canton". Consider rst the direct federal income
tax. The Swiss tax authorities provides data points for typical married households
(without child and with two children) between gross income and tax burden (see
Administration Federale des contributions [1]). We used these points for estimating
our taxation function. The tax authorities provide the same kind of data for each
canton for tax burden at the municipality and the canton levels. We selected a
functional form where the average tax rate is non-decreasing in income to ensure
progressivity. We chose the following generalized logistic function (14)
(Y ) =
T (Y )
Y
= (Y ) = to +
(t1   to)
1 + e (+Y )
; (A8)
 > 0 and  > 0
 0() > 0 and  00() > 0 if Y > Y
where  is the average tax rate. In order to take into account of the possible de-
ductions due to the presence of children in the household, we estimate the function
(Y  C) = T (Y;C) =(Y  C); where C is the number of children present in the
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household and  is a parameter to be estimated. Equation (14) has been estimated
by standard non-linear least squares. The functional form satises the following
properties TY > 0, TY Y > 0; TC < 0, TCC > 0 and TY C < 0:
The Swiss tax system is very heterogenous. Not only we have got 26 dier-
ent tax schedules, but there are also a lot of dierences in how deductions for
the presence of children and general lump sum deductions are applied17. More
importantly, there are also dierences between municipalities by the application
of dierent taxation coecient. Obviously this function will only be an approx-
imation of what really are the marginal tax rates, but considering for instance
dierences in taxes due to municipality residence would be a tremendous task and
far beyond the scope of our analysis.
- Insert Tables A2a to A4 -
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Figure 2: Distribution of men’s work hours
Table 1: Labour supply regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(ωf) 80.917 65.556 71.621 64.950
(2.82)** (2.48)* (2.50)* (2.37)*
mf -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(3.82)** (5.15)** (4.86)** (5.20)**
hm 0.142
(2.27)*
1[40≤hm≤42] 10.364 9.352
(1.81) (1.68)
1[hm>42] 13.160 -33.979
(2.05)* (1.83)
hm·1[hm>42] 0.244
(2.33)*
uw -16.802 -14.392 -15.308 -14.278
(3.94)** (3.70)** (3.63)** (3.55)**
um -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(2.54)* (1.90) (2.09)* (1.88)
Constant 62.523 61.308 62.727 74.749
(1.23) (1.10) (1.11) (1.38)
Observations 2795 2795 2795 2795
Uncensored observations 1633 1633 1633 1633
Log-likelihood -9768.57 -9769.40 -9769.17 -9769.04
J-statistic p-value 0.927 0.768 0.774 0.766
Root MSE 52 48 49 48
Akaike criterion 6.991 6.991 6.991 6.991
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Table 2: Within period elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ehf,wm 1.33 1.028 1.143 1.016
(1.86) (1.50) (1.64) (1.49)
Ehf,wm -1.142 -1.383 -1.325 -1.392
(1.702) (2.06) (1.98) (2.09)
Ehf,N -0.259 -0.313 -0.3 -0.316
(0.481) (0.583) (0.558) (0.586)
Note: standard deviation in parentheses
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Meana Standard deviation
hf
b 96.62 52.33
Wife's gross wage b 33.08 18.25
Wife's participation rate 0.59 0.49
Marginal tax rate 0.26 0.08
Average tax rate 0.14 0.05
Non-labor income 1636.98 2466.12
ln(earingsm) 8.80 0.37
Husband's earnings (earningsm) 7120.89 2843.47
Husband's gross hourly wage 42.61 17.16
Number of children younger than 5 0.44 0.71
Number of children aged between 5 and 10 0.36 0.65
Number of children aged between 10 and 15 0.25 0.56
Number of children older than 15 0.26 0.60
1[hm<40] 0.06 0.24
1[40≤hm≤42] 0.68 0.47
1[hm>42] 0.26 0.44
hm 168.61 21.55
Wife's age 39.65 9.56
(Wife's age)2 1663.29 801.75
Wife's education 12.17 1.71
(Wife's education)2 150.95 41.47
(Husband's education)2 12.94 2.05
Wife: unskilled worker 0.05 0.23
Wife: skilled worker 0.01 0.09
Wife: clerical 0.14 0.34
Wife: intermediate position 0.15 0.36
Wife: intellectual profession 0.05 0.22
Wife: intermediate position 0.15 0.36
Wife: German speaking 0.63 0.48
Wife: French speaking 0.21 0.40
Wife: Swiss nationality 0.81 0.39
Husband: Swiss nationality 0.80 0.40
Mittelland region 0.24 0.43
Lemanic region 0.19 0.39
North-western Switzerland 0.13 0.34
South-East Switzerland 0.15 0.36
Central Switzerland 0.09 0.28
Wife's potential experience 21.48 9.78
(Wife's potential experience)2 556.98 471.46
(Wife's education)2 150.95 41.47
1[youngest child younger than 2] 0.19 0.39
1[youngest child aged between 2 and 5] 0.14 0.35
1[youngest child aged 5 and 10] 0.15 0.35
Large urban area 0.31 0.46
Husband: unskilled worker 0.04 0.19
Husband: craftman 0.18 0.38
Observations 2795
a: weighted averages 
b: average for the sample of working females 
Note: monetary variables are in CHF
Source: ERC 1998
Table A2a: Labour supply regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(ωf) 80.917 65.556 71.621 64.950
(2.82)** (2.48)* (2.50)* (2.37)*
mf -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(3.82)** (5.15)** (4.86)** (5.20)**
Number of children younger than 5 -28.162 -25.606 -26.404 -25.634
(7.31)** (7.46)** (7.35)** (7.36)**
Number of children aged between 5 and 10 -22.898 -21.546 -22.052 -21.770
(8.32)** (8.38)** (8.20)** (8.21)**
Number of children aged between 10 and 15 -10.180 -9.889 -9.930 -10.038
(5.29)** (5.12)** (5.14)** (5.20)**
hm 0.142
(2.27)*
1[40≤hm≤42] 10.364 9.352
(1.81) (1.68)
1[hm>42] 13.160 -33.979
(2.05)* (1.83)
hm·1[hm>42] 0.244
(2.33)*
Wife's age -5.770 -4.826 -5.055 -4.635
(3.34)** (3.03)** (3.05)** (2.92)**
(Wife's age)2 0.058 0.048 0.051 0.046
(2.94)** (2.61)** (2.64)** (2.49)*
Wife's education -1.523 -1.364 -1.421 -1.414
(2.13)* (1.92) (1.95) (1.94)
Wife: unskilled worker -31.487 -31.160 -31.443 -31.212
(8.25)** (8.13)** (8.04)** (8.03)**
Wife: skilled worker 39.255 35.696 36.427 35.846
(4.23)** (3.97)** (4.02)** (3.98)**
Wife: clerical -5.569 -5.390 -5.729 -5.430
(1.72) (1.63) (1.67) (1.60)
Wife: intermediate position -19.419 -16.568 -17.372 -16.463
(2.71)** (2.41)* (2.41)* (2.34)*
Wife: intellectual profession -31.924 -26.213 -27.501 -26.148
(2.86)** (2.54)* (2.55)* (2.49)*
Wife: German speaking -7.166 -7.436 -7.158 -7.295
(2.90)** (2.98)** (2.88)** (2.93)**
Wife: Swiss nationality -13.919 -12.603 -13.211 -12.581
(3.54)** (3.30)** (3.35)** (3.25)**
Husband: Swiss nationality -6.721 -6.004 -6.202 -5.927
(2.06)* (1.85) (1.91) (1.83)
Mittelland region 5.146 3.922 4.441 3.841
(1.53) (1.21) (1.31) (1.16)
Lemanic region 5.880 6.172 6.324 6.192
(1.94) (2.03)* (2.07)* (2.03)*
Central Switzerland 5.839 4.901 5.095 5.026
(1.39) (1.18) (1.22) (1.20)
uw -16.802 -14.392 -15.308 -14.278
(3.94)** (3.70)** (3.63)** (3.55)**
um -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(2.54)* (1.90) (2.09)* (1.88)
Constant 62.523 61.308 62.727 74.749
(1.23) (1.10) (1.11) (1.38)
Observations 2795 2795 2795 2795
Uncensored observations 1633 1633 1633 1633
Log-likelihood -9768.57 -9769.4 -9769.17 -9769.04
J-statistic p-value 0.927 0.768 0.774 0.766
Root MSE 52 48 49 48
Akaike criterion 6.991 6.991 6.991 6.991
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Table A2b: Regression of hf, participation decision 1[hf>0]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(earingsm) -0.614 -0.623 -0.625 -0.626
(7.26)** (7.36)** (7.38)** (7.39)**
(Husband's potential experience)2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(5.97)** (6.00)** (6.00)** (6.01)**
1[hm<40] 0.100 0.091 0.071 0.071
(0.85) (0.77) (0.59) (0.59)
1[hm>42] -0.045 -0.040 -0.048 -0.048
(0.78) (0.68) (0.80) (0.80)
Wife's potential experience 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042
(2.89)** (2.93)** (2.93)** (2.94)**
(Wife's education)2 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(4.32)** (4.39)** (4.40)** (4.40)**
husband: Swiss nationality -0.345 -0.345 -0.344 -0.344
(4.41)** (4.41)** (4.40)** (4.40)**
1[youngest child younger than 2] -1.130 -1.135 -1.135 -1.137
(7.17)** (7.22)** (7.22)** (7.23)**
1[youngest child aged between 2 and 5] -0.971 -0.976 -0.976 -0.976
(6.84)** (6.90)** (6.89)** (6.90)**
1[youngest child aged 5 and 10] -0.495 -0.499 -0.498 -0.498
(4.21)** (4.26)** (4.25)** (4.25)**
Number of children younger than 5 -0.290 -0.286 -0.286 -0.285
(3.42)** (3.39)** (3.38)** (3.38)**
Number of children aged between 5 and 10 -0.136 -0.133 -0.134 -0.134
(2.24)* (2.20)* (2.21)* (2.21)*
Number of children aged between 10 and 15 -0.204 -0.203 -0.203 -0.203
(4.08)** (4.06)** (4.07)** (4.07)**
Large urban area 0.138 0.139 0.140 0.141
(2.04)* (2.07)* (2.08)* (2.09)*
Mittelland region 0.259 0.257 0.258 0.257
(2.06)* (2.05)* (2.06)* (2.05)*
Lemanic region 0.143 0.140 0.142 0.141
(1.01) (0.99) (1.00) (0.99)
Region of Zurich 0.401 0.400 0.400 0.399
(2.89)** (2.89)** (2.89)** (2.89)**
North-western Switzerland 0.202 0.201 0.202 0.201
(1.51) (1.51) (1.51) (1.50)
South-East Switzerland 0.229 0.226 0.227 0.226
(1.71) (1.69) (1.70) (1.69)
Central Switzerland 0.231 0.230 0.231 0.230
(1.58) (1.58) (1.58) (1.58)
Husband: unskilled worker 0.160 0.158 0.158 0.159
(1.14) (1.13) (1.13) (1.14)
Husband: craftman -0.279 -0.281 -0.281 -0.281
(3.95)** (4.00)** (4.00)** (4.00)**
Wife: German speaking 0.189 0.190 0.189 0.189
(2.05)* (2.06)* (2.05)* (2.05)*
Wife: French speaking 0.347 0.348 0.347 0.347
(3.15)** (3.17)** (3.16)** (3.16)**
Constant 5.792 5.856 5.879 5.882
(8.26)** (8.35)** (8.37)** (8.38)**
τ=ln(1-ρ)/(1+ρ) -0.478 -0.501 -0.497 -0.500
(4.42)** (4.81)** (4.73)** (4.79)**
ln(σ) 3.648 3.654 3.653 3.654
(132.01)** (132.32)** (132.27)** (132.23)**
Observations 2795 2795 2795 2795
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Table A3a: Regression of ln(ωf)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(earingsm) -0.032 0.009 0.005 0.011
(0.99) (0.28) (0.15) (0.33)
(Wife's education)2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(2.70)** (2.63)** (2.38)* (2.50)*
Number of children older than 15 -0.050 -0.052 -0.051 -0.051
(2.94)** (3.08)** (3.03)** (3.04)**
(Husband's education)2 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.41) (0.03) (0.16) (0.14)
Number of children younger than 5 0.110 0.103 0.103 0.103
(4.42)** (4.13)** (4.11)** (4.12)**
Number of children aged between 5 and 10 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.068
(3.67)** (3.68)** (3.65)** (3.79)**
Number of children aged between 10 and 15 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007
(0.48) (0.39) (0.46) (0.36)
hm -0.002
(4.13)**
1[40≤hm≤42] -0.149 -0.148
(3.49)** (3.50)**
1[hm>42] -0.173 0.235
(3.85)** (1.23)
hm·1[hm>42] -0.002
(2.21)*
Wife's age 0.050 0.047 0.046 0.045
(5.06)** (4.82)** (4.73)** (4.62)**
(Wife's age)2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(4.62)** (4.47)** (4.37)** (4.26)**
Wife's education -0.044 -0.042 -0.037 -0.039
(2.07)* (1.99)* (1.74) (1.84)
Wife: unskilled worker 0.063 0.065 0.066 0.067
(1.71) (1.78) (1.80) (1.83)
Wife: skilled worker -0.072 -0.069 -0.066 -0.070
(0.84) (0.81) (0.77) (0.82)
Wife: clerical 0.094 0.094 0.095 0.095
(3.56)** (3.58)** (3.61)** (3.62)**
Wife: intermediate position 0.267 0.265 0.259 0.262
(10.17)** (10.15)** (9.87)** (10.01)**
Wife: intellectual profession 0.380 0.366 0.358 0.363
(9.55)** (9.21)** (8.94)** (9.06)**
Wife: German speaking 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.008
(0.30) (0.40) (0.24) (0.30)
Wife: Swiss nationality 0.087 0.086 0.087 0.086
(2.61)** (2.58)** (2.60)** (2.60)**
Husband: Swiss nationality 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.011
(0.47) (0.36) (0.37) (0.34)
Mittelland region -0.082 -0.084 -0.084 -0.084
(3.46)** (3.56)** (3.56)** (3.56)**
Lemanic region -0.008 -0.013 -0.015 -0.015
(0.27) (0.44) (0.48) (0.47)
Central Switzerland -0.060 -0.063 -0.061 -0.064
(1.61) (1.70) (1.63) (1.72)
Constant 2.238 2.288 2.146 2.119
(7.26)** (7.46)** (6.97)** (6.89)**
Observations 2795 2795 2795 2795
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Table A3b: Participation decision equation, ln(ωf)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(earingsm) -0.587 -0.593 -0.595 -0.595
(6.82)** (6.89)** (6.92)** (6.92)**
(Husband's potential experience)2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(5.91)** (5.93)** (5.92)** (5.92)**
1[hm<40] 0.131 0.103 0.091 0.090
(1.08) (0.85) (0.75) (0.75)
1[hm>42] -0.055 -0.043 -0.048 -0.048
(0.92) (0.73) (0.80) (0.80)
Wife's potential experience 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041
(2.80)** (2.83)** (2.83)** (2.83)**
(Wife's education)2 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(4.20)** (4.24)** (4.25)** (4.25)**
husband: Swiss nationality -0.327 -0.328 -0.328 -0.328
(4.18)** (4.19)** (4.18)** (4.19)**
1[youngest child younger than 2] -1.055 -1.057 -1.059 -1.057
(6.51)** (6.52)** (6.53)** (6.52)**
1[youngest child aged between 2 and 5] -0.920 -0.925 -0.925 -0.925
(6.29)** (6.32)** (6.32)** (6.32)**
1[youngest child aged 5 and 10] -0.455 -0.458 -0.457 -0.458
(3.76)** (3.78)** (3.77)** (3.78)**
Number of children younger than 5 -0.331 -0.330 -0.329 -0.330
(3.81)** (3.80)** (3.79)** (3.80)**
Number of children aged between 5 and 10 -0.159 -0.157 -0.158 -0.157
(2.55)* (2.53)* (2.54)* (2.53)*
Number of children aged between 10 and 15 -0.216 -0.216 -0.216 -0.216
(4.32)** (4.33)** (4.33)** (4.32)**
Large urban area 0.123 0.122 0.123 0.122
(1.76) (1.76) (1.77) (1.76)
Mittelland region 0.356 0.355 0.354 0.355
(2.79)** (2.78)** (2.77)** (2.78)**
Lemanic region 0.234 0.234 0.233 0.234
(1.61) (1.61) (1.61) (1.61)
Region of Zurich 0.525 0.524 0.521 0.523
(3.70)** (3.68)** (3.66)** (3.67)**
North-western Switzerland 0.300 0.301 0.300 0.301
(2.21)* (2.21)* (2.20)* (2.21)*
South-East Switzerland 0.338 0.339 0.338 0.339
(2.50)* (2.51)* (2.50)* (2.51)*
Central Switzerland 0.321 0.320 0.320 0.320
(2.18)* (2.17)* (2.16)* (2.17)*
Husband: unskilled worker 0.219 0.217 0.216 0.216
(1.52) (1.50) (1.50) (1.49)
Husband: craftman -0.251 -0.253 -0.253 -0.254
(3.49)** (3.51)** (3.51)** (3.52)**
Wife: German speaking 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169
(1.82) (1.81) (1.82) (1.81)
Wife: French speaking 0.325 0.326 0.325 0.326
(2.88)** (2.88)** (2.88)** (2.88)**
Constant 5.492 5.536 5.558 5.556
(7.66)** (7.73)** (7.76)** (7.76)**
τ=ln(1-ρw)/(1+ρw) -0.203 -0.186 -0.178 -0.181
(2.07)* (1.90) (1.81) (1.84)
ln(σw) -0.944 -0.951 -0.951 -0.952
(47.20)** (48.39)** (48.74)** (48.69)**
Observations 2795 2795 2795 2795
Uncensored observations 1633 1633 1633 1633
Log-likelihood -2337.55 -2329.07 -2330.14 -2327.72
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Table A4: Virtual nonlabour income regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(earingsm) 1,668.039 1,619.311 1,669.286 1,647.141
(15.20)** (14.48)** (14.83)** (14.52)**
(Wife's education)2 -6.783 -6.699 -6.772 -6.994
(2.39)* (2.38)* (2.40)* (2.46)*
Number of children older than 15 738.586 741.402 738.804 740.333
(12.43)** (12.48)** (12.43)** (12.47)**
(Husband's education)2 38.952 41.977 38.494 37.808
(1.89) (2.02)* (1.85) (1.81)
Number of children younger than 5 535.812 538.285 535.771 535.323
(12.02)** (12.07)** (12.00)** (12.01)**
Number of children aged between 5 and 10 453.897 453.542 453.278 450.277
(10.37)** (10.31)** (10.35)** (10.30)**
Number of children aged between 10 and 15 501.574 500.144 499.871 499.008
(9.12)** (9.11)** (9.11)** (9.15)**
hm 2.549
(1.74)
1[40≤hm≤42] -14.347 -11.718
(0.09) (0.07)
1[hm>42] 40.689 -997.247
(0.24) (1.91)
hm·1[hm>42] 5.521
(2.05)*
Wife's age -73.446 -71.253 -73.040 -71.451
(2.13)* (2.01)* (2.11)* (2.07)*
(Wife's age)2 1.247 1.230 1.243 1.224
(2.96)** (2.84)** (2.94)** (2.91)**
Wife's education 110.537 108.340 110.392 113.835
(1.96) (1.93) (1.97)* (2.01)*
Wife: unskilled worker -294.235 -298.484 -289.514 -293.635
(3.03)** (3.07)** (2.98)** (3.01)**
Wife: skilled worker -1,502.259 -1,508.578 -1,502.194 -1,492.675
(6.72)** (6.76)** (6.71)** (6.66)**
Wife: clerical -772.967 -773.972 -772.593 -771.470
(8.74)** (8.74)** (8.72)** (8.70)**
Wife: intermediate position -960.064 -958.720 -959.528 -968.052
(9.58)** (9.58)** (9.59)** (9.68)**
Wife: intellectual profession -1,182.354 -1,163.094 -1,182.237 -1,191.061
(7.44)** (7.32)** (7.30)** (7.38)**
Wife: German speaking -82.234 -86.745 -83.969 -84.248
(1.05) (1.10) (1.07) (1.07)
Wife: Swiss nationality 8.687 13.504 11.423 13.339
(0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12)
Husband: Swiss nationality 215.539 215.504 213.367 213.997
(2.18)* (2.18)* (2.15)* (2.16)*
Mittelland region -53.420 -53.291 -53.732 -53.892
(0.77) (0.77) (0.78) (0.78)
Lemanic region -67.780 -64.263 -68.738 -67.962
(0.75) (0.71) (0.76) (0.75)
Central Switzerland -84.420 -83.277 -86.259 -77.564
(0.76) (0.75) (0.77) (0.69)
Constant -13,327.928 -13,416.549 -13,341.248 -13,178.693
(11.82)** (11.53)** (11.83)** (11.68)**
Observations 2795 2795 2795 2795
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
